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Social Struggle Against the U.S. Navy
in Vieques, Puerto Rico
Two Movements in History
by
Katherine T. McCaffrey
The grassroots struggle against the U.S. Navy in Vieques transcended
highly divisive colonial politics to build unprecedented political solidarity in
Puerto Rico. The success of the recent Vieques movement in shutting down a
U.S. Navy live-fire training facility contrasts with the experience of an earlier
grassroots struggle in the 1970s. Whereas cold-war politics impeded the earlier activists from forging the alliances and formulating the vision that might
advance their cause, a changed political context in the 1990s opened up a new
space for protest to develop. Activists’ new focus on peace was crucial to
strengthening, expanding, and internationalizing the Vieques movement.
Keywords: Vieques, Puerto Rico, U.S. Navy, social movements, peace

In May 2003 the U.S. Navy shut down its live-fire training ground on the
Puerto Rican island municipality of Vieques. The base closure marked the
victory of a grassroots movement against the world’s most powerful military.
Since World War II the navy had maintained a major training installation on
this 51-square-mile island, located six miles off the southeast coast of Puerto
Rico. Its retreat came after four years of mass mobilization, thousands of
arrests for civil disobedience, and international media attention to the struggle to halt live bombing exercises on the island. While Vieques was the site of
one of the navy’s key military installations in the Western Hemisphere, it was
also home to 10,000 U.S. citizens, who lived sandwiched between an ammunition depot and a maneuver area. The expansion of the base and the intensification of weapons testing and maneuvers had created an environment that
was incompatible with a viable residential community. This article examines
the way the grassroots struggle against the navy overcame highly divisive
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colonial politics to build unprecedented political solidarity in Puerto Rico.
It analyzes the success of the Vieques movement in relation to a less successful grassroots struggle that unfolded on the island in the late 1970s and
focuses on the framing of opposition to the U.S. military at different historic
moments.
The catalyst for the recent protest was the accidental death of a civilian
employee on the base. On April 19, 1999, during a routine training mission,
two navy jets missed their mark by a mile and a half. Flying between 500 and
1,300 miles per hour, they dropped two 500-pound bombs not on the liveimpact range but on the barbed-wire-ringed observation post from which the
navy surveyed the shelling. The navy’s range control officer and three security guards inside the observation post were injured by fragments of shattered
glass and concrete. David Sanes Rodríguez, a thirty-five-year-old civilian
security guard on patrol outside, was knocked unconscious by the explosion
and bled to death from his injuries.
Within days of Sanes’s death, waves of protesters positioned themselves
as human shields on the bombing range, bringing military maneuvers to a
halt. Scaling fences or arriving by fishing boat, activists poured onto the
bombing range, building over a dozen encampments on the target zone.
Thousands of supporters from Vieques, Puerto Rico, and the United States
visited the campsites to express their solidarity. Puerto Rico’s governor,
Pedro Rosselló, a loyal ally of the U.S. government and military, called for an
immediate halt to the bombing. The support of Puerto Ricans on the main
island, the diaspora, and international allies helped to create a powerful
movement that eventually caused the navy to abandon its “crown jewel” in
the Western Hemisphere.
The Vieques movement points to the power of locally based social movements that are linked to broader goals, visions, and alliances. In the past two
decades theorists have analyzed and debated the significance of small-scale
popular movements in Latin America (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998;
Eckstein, 1989; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Fox and Starn, 1997). Rather
than seeking total social transformation, these small movements focus on
more specific, concrete, everyday concerns and grievances. Hellman (1997)
cautions, however, that unless locally based social movements are connected
to broad-based visions and goals and forge wider alliances, they risk political
insignificance. In Vieques, a key aspect of expanding the struggle was finding a meaningful framework that would build wider solidarity while sidestepping the volatile issue of Puerto Rican sovereignty.
In the late 1970s, cold-war politics impeded activists from forging the alliances and formulating the vision that might advance their cause. A focus on
local fishermen and their grievances against the navy appealed to the
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economic and cultural nationalist dimensions of the struggle, but it ultimately narrowed the movement, which succumbed to political pressure and
navy strong-arm tactics. In the 1990s, the political climate beyond Vieques’s
shores shifted dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of the cold war. The threat of communism in Latin America that had justified
U.S. military actions in Vieques suddenly disappeared. The changed political
context opened up a new space for protest to develop. Activists’new focus on
peace was crucial to strengthening, expanding, and internationalizing the
Vieques movement.
The article first considers the way material grievances in Vieques are complicated by broader political forces emanating from Puerto Rico’s colonial
status. It then outlines the roots of the conflict in the history of military control over the island. Its central concern is to examine the mobilizations
against the navy in the 1970s and the 1990s through historical analysis and
comparison of their politics and discourse.

COLONIAL CITIZENS
Much recent analysis of conflict around military bases assumes that
nationalist ideology is a central motivating factor (Smith, 2000). In Vieques,
however, conflict had its foundation in the material conditions of everyday
life. Vieques is the poorest municipality in Puerto Rico, with 73 percent of the
population living below the poverty line. It has among the highest rates of
unemployment, with almost half the adult population lacking work according to the 1990 census. It has among the highest infant mortality rates in
Puerto Rico and a growing rate of cancer and other health problems that residents believe are caused by weapons testing. Although military bases are
commonly assumed to provide jobs and economic growth for surrounding
communities, the military’s legacy in Vieques has been poverty and stagnation. What the recent mobilization in Vieques made clear was that the material harm caused by the military—the destruction of the ecology, the health
effects of weapons testing, the squelching of economic development, the dislocation of civilians and the navy’s antagonism toward them—was the basis
of protest.
Vieques’s local grievances became enmeshed, however, in broader political controversies connected to the geopolitical interests of the U.S. military
and the colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States.
Vieques is a municipality of Puerto Rico, a nonsovereign territory of the
United States. Its residents are U.S. citizens who serve in the U.S. armed
forces and can be drafted to fight in times of war but who have neither
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political representation in Congress nor the right to vote for president. As
Ayala (2003) notes, U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico operates through a combination of coercion and consent. The predicament of Vieques, an inhabited
bombing range, illustrates the more naked forms of domination: the usurpation of national territory and the exercise of power in the face of widespread
discontent. But colonialism is also maintained through consent. The extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans in 1917 effectively silenced more
vigorous protest by offering individuals the rights of citizenship even while
denying Puerto Rico a place in the American polity. Puerto Rican citizens
have freedom of movement to the United States and privileged access to the
labor market denied their Latin American neighbors. They have high rates of
participation in the U.S. military and live on an island with a strong presence
of U.S. armed forces and bases. Political debate in Puerto Rico is shaped primarily by autonomism, the struggle to advance local interests within the
colonial framework. A vocal minority advocates independence, radicalizing
political discourse and tapping into widespread cultural nationalism (Ayala,
2003: 217), but the large majority of the Puerto Rican population is politically moderate, preferring continued political and economic ties to the
United States even while maintaining a profound sense of Puerto Rican identity (Dávila, 1997; Duany, 2000; 2002; Morris, 1995).
Conflict with the military exposes the ambivalence about citizenship, sovereignty, and national identity that are at the heart of Puerto Rican society
(see Flores, 2000; Negrón-Muntaner and Grosfoguel, 1997). As both a
potent symbol of American influence and a powerful actor in island affairs,
the U.S. military evokes charged debates over loyalty and identity. In general,
opposition to the military is viewed as part of the anticolonial movement.
What is peculiar about Vieques’s struggle is the way residents have struggled
to assert specific material grievances that are a fundamental consequence of
Puerto Rico’s political domination by the United States and its armed forces
while avoiding the delicate issue of sovereignty.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The U.S. Navy usurped three-quarters of Vieques Island in a series of land
expropriations during and after World War II.1 The rise of German fascism
and the outbreak of war in Europe had raised U.S. anxiety about the security
of the Caribbean region and the Panama Canal. Declaring a national emergency, the navy expropriated 6,680 acres of land in eastern Puerto Rico and
21,020 acres of Vieques, two-thirds of that island’s land, to build the Roosevelt
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Roads Naval Station, which was intended to rival Pearl Harbor in scale and
significance.
At the time of the military occupation in the early 1940s, Vieques Island
was devoted to sugarcane cultivation. Two large estates, one U.S.-controlled
and the other Puerto Rican–owned, dominated the local economy and controlled most of the land. Stark social inequality and overwhelming poverty
facilitated the military takeover. The landless majority who lived on the
expropriated acres had little political clout, and thousands were evicted from
their homes and deposited in razed cane fields that the navy declared “resettlement tracts.”
Initially, the base created a construction boom that provided employment
and filled residents with hope. The construction of the base, however,
stopped almost as quickly as it had begun. Military priorities shifted to the
Pacific when the United States entered the war, and the navy scaled back its
original plans. The devastation at Pearl Harbor challenged the wisdom of
concentrating a fleet at one massive installation (Tugwell, 1976: 68). The
construction of the massive stone and cement breakwater from Puerto Rico to
Vieques was suspended, and work on Roosevelt Roads slowed because of a
shortage of supplies. The abrupt halt of construction had a disastrous effect
on Vieques’s economy.
In 1947 the navy drew up new strategic plans for Vieques. It redesignated
Roosevelt Roads as a naval training installation and fuel depot (Langley,
1985: 273). Vieques was to be used for firing practice and amphibious landings by tens of thousands of sailors and marines. Because this new vision of
the base required more land, the navy expropriated over 4,000 acres from
eastern Vieques, displacing 130 families. With three-quarters of its land
usurped, Vieques found its quality of life severely debased and its economy
crippled.
Although the United States was officially at peace, Vieques became a hostage of the cold war. Despite growing social tensions and repeated calls for
the return of the land, the military remained entrenched on the island. After
the Korean War, U.S. rivalry with the Soviet Union intensified. The Soviets’
testing of the guided missile gave the United States new impetus to compete
for technological superiority. Roosevelt Roads assumed new strategic significance as a place to test missiles, and Vieques was the perfect bull’s-eye
(Langley, 1985). The Cuban Revolution of 1959 jolted the U.S. military,
which feared the rise of communism in a crucial strategic position in the
region. That year the navy activated a marine base on Vieques, Camp García.
With the fear of a “communist menace” in Latin America, Vieques took on an
increasing importance as a staging ground for interventions, as in, for example,
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Guatemala in 1954 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. When the Bay of
Pigs invasion failed in 1961, the surviving forces gathered in Vieques.
Although the navy maintained no formal jurisdiction over the civilian sector, in reality it controlled the fate of the entire island. It controlled the majority of the land, water, and air surrounding Vieques. It controlled nautical
routes, flight paths, aquifers, and zoning laws in civilian territory. It blocked
developers from establishing a resort on the island. It held title to the resettlement tracts in the civilian sector, where the majority of the island’s population lived under constant threat of eviction. In 1961 it drafted secret plans to
remove the entire civilian population of 8,000 from the island; even the dead
were to be dug up and removed from their graves (Fernández, 1996). The
plan would have allowed the navy to expand the base without interference.
Governor Luis Muñoz Marín intervened and a presidential order from President John F. Kennedy eventually blocked the navy from carrying out its plans,
but the tension between the military and civilian population persisted.
Vieques’s plight dramatically exposed Puerto Rico’s lack of sovereignty
and subordinate status within the U.S. orbit of power. Although President
Harry Truman had proclaimed Puerto Rico’s colonial status resolved in 1952
with the conferral of “commonwealth status,” its newly conceived political
relationship with the United States did not confer self-determination. Ultimate power lay not in the hands of islanders but in the U.S. Congress. Puerto
Ricans continued to hold U.S. citizenship but had no representation in federal
government. They paid no federal taxes but were subject to the military draft.
Foreign policy matters were in the hands of the United States. Nowhere was
the contradiction between internal autonomy and external control over “foreign policy” so vividly expressed as in Vieques, where U.S. national security
directly impinged upon the community’s internal affairs.
Despite Puerto Rico’s heralded commonwealth status, the U.S. navy continued to function as a colonial power in Vieques. Nationalists and advocates
of Puerto Rican independence long viewed Vieques as a rallying point for
opposition to U.S. imperialism. In the 1940s, the nationalist leader Pedro
Albizu Campos denounced the U.S. occupation of Vieques as the “vivisection of the Puerto Rican nation.” Despite the apparent clarity of the injustice—the virtual stranglehold the navy held on the island and its antagonism
toward the resident civilian population—residents’ understanding of the
navy and the nature of their dilemma was ambivalent and divided. This
ambivalence expressed itself in the protest movement that unfolded in 1978.
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COLD-WAR SOCIAL STRUGGLES
In the late 1970s, protest erupted in Vieques in response to the intensification of maneuvers and live-fire exercises on the island. When a militant
anticolonial movement opposing live-fire exercises emerged on the neighboring island of Culebra, the navy transferred bombing to Vieques, and the
heightened bombing and stepped-up maneuvers pushed Vieques’s conflict
over the edge.2 For approximately five years, 1978–1983, fishermen led a
dramatic grassroots struggle against the military presence in Vieques. Positioning themselves in the direct line of missile fire, they succeeded in interrupting international military maneuvers. Pickets, demonstrations, and a
campaign of civil disobedience put Vieques’s grievances on an international
stage. The U.S. Congress held hearings on naval activities on the island and
recommended that the navy leave Vieques (U.S. House, 1981). Geraldo
Rivera traveled to the island with his film crew. The fisherman leader Carlos
Zenón spoke before the UN decolonization committee on Vieques’s crisis.
Daily papers in Puerto Rico tracked the conflict. Thousands of islanders and
supporters were mobilized in Vieques, Puerto Rico, and the United States.
Despite winning several important concessions from the navy and broadcasting Vieques’s plight to the world, the movement was ultimately unsuccessful in its goal of evicting the navy and recovering land. Three major factors were responsible for its failure. First, activists emphasized local
economic grievances rather than the broader political or human rights aspects
of the case. Second, they were ambivalent in the alliances they formed with a
broader network of supporters, emphasizing a hierarchical structure with
local leadership and control of the movement. Finally, they contested the
navy at a moment of increased military entrenchment.
Both the fisherman-led movement of the 1970s and the more recent mobilization emerged from the grass roots in response to military incursions. Both
evoked discourse that sidestepped charged debates over Puerto Rican sovereignty. The earlier movement, however, erupted at a time of heightened coldwar tensions that constrained its effectiveness. In 1979 Soviet tanks rolled
into Afghanistan, a wave of revolutionary movements swept Central America and the Caribbean basin, and the U.S. public consciousness was shaped
by grim images of hostages in Iran. The United States dramatically expanded
its economic and military presence in the Caribbean, intervening in regional
conflicts and arming and training security forces in the basin. This polarized
political climate shaped the movement’s expression and, ultimately, its
outcome.
Vieques activists resisted framing their grievances in broad political terms
that would confront the issue of Puerto Rican sovereignty and thus raise
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potentially divisive questions of loyalty, patriotism, and national identity.
Although the movement emerged in direct response to the intensification of
maneuvers and the shifting of bombing exercises from Culebra to Vieques,
activists did not address the broader human rights aspects of the conflict.
Instead, they emphasized that the local movement was not about politics but
about the “authentic” problems of the Vieques people—the concrete, material needs of the people that seemed to be ignored by the maneuverings of
politicians and activists with broader agendas. Discourse focused on the
struggle of the fishermen: the destruction of traps and fishing gear by navy
boats on maneuvers and the restrictions on the use of prime fishing grounds.
There were several motivations for narrowing the focus. First, compared with
the recent Culebra mobilization, which was spearheaded and sustained by the
Puerto Rican Independence party, the Vieques movement emerged from a
community with a prostatehood majority and mayor. A focus on local grievances was effective in building consensus in a politically conservative populace. It was also a way of keeping Viequense leadership at the helm and preventing the movement from becoming merely a platform for the cause of
Puerto Rican independence or a tool of political interests. Fishermen were
important to the success of the movement because they characterized it as
based on issues of quality of life and economic opportunity as opposed to
broader anticolonial concerns.
The fisherman-led mobilization fused highly confrontational tactics with
moderate politics. Fishermen in 18-foot boats positioned themselves in the
direct line of missile fire, halting warfare training at sea. They became key
protagonists on an island where residents were vehemently opposed to military practices that stifled the economy and impinged upon their freedom.
Fishermen, furthermore, talked not about imperialism but about the damage
that ships caused to their traps. They argued not for Puerto Rican independence but for their individual rights as U.S. citizens to make a living. They
served as cultural icons evocative of the island’s rural past and harnessed cultural nationalist sentiment and a strong local identity for resistance against
the military.
There were strategic weaknesses, however, in framing grievances in local
economic terms and in emphasizing the fishermen’s leadership of the grassroots movement. The David-and-Goliath imagery of fishermen in wooden
boats confronting battleships at sea was evocative and built international
sympathy for Vieques’s cause, but the movement’s failure to highlight the
live bombing of an inhabited island was a lost opportunity for building
broader support. The Vieques solidarity network in Puerto Rico and the
United States, while militant and committed, emanated almost entirely from
the political left (McCaffrey, 1998). This contrasted significantly with the
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more recent movement, in which solidarity was extremely broad and cut
across class, religion, and political affiliation. Puerto Rico- and U.S.-based
supporters perceived the anticolonial dimensions of the case but were discouraged by local activists from developing the political dimensions of the
struggle. Tensions erupted over questions of leadership, with local
Viequense activists asserting the right to frame the terms and direction of the
struggle. When Puerto Rico–based supporters burned an American flag at a
demonstration at the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba, fractures
developed in the movement, with some members arguing that outside forces
were attempting to hijack the struggle as a platform for the independence
movement.
On a local level, the focus on fishermen and male leadership limited
women’s participation in the movement. Vieques women were involved in
the mobilization, but their participation was often auxiliary. They picketed,
demonstrated, wrote pamphlets, and cooked rice and beans for protesters but
did not give press conferences, travel on lecture circuits, or rise to leadership
positions. Circumscribing the participation of half of the population limited
potential sources of creativity and solidarity. Women often play instrumental
roles in community-based mobilizations, especially when they perceive
threats to their internalized domestic or caretaking roles (Kaplan, 1982;
1990). The focus on fishing traps rather than live bombing exercises, however, inhibited the growth of what Temma Kaplan (1982) has called “female
consciousness.”
The movement’s failure can in large part be attributed to a broader political context that was hostile to Vieques’s cause. The navy made clear its determination to hold onto Vieques and sought to squelch the movement by dividing it.3 The military attempted to build a civilian constituency on the island by
hiring 100 residents to work on the base as civilian security guards. It hired a
community-relations official to organize a militant pronavy support group
that held promilitary counterdemonstrations calling the protesters’ patriotism into question. By focusing the debate on politics, the group aimed to
drive a wedge between local residents and Puerto Rican leftist supporters.
Increasingly, the navy and its support group sought to undermine the movement by depicting it as a communist insurgency run by outside agitators. It
arrested demonstrators for trespassing on navy land and moved the conflict
into the federal court system, which was largely sympathetic to its position.
In court, protest was treated as a threat to national security and, again, the
protesters’ patriotism was called into question.
One particular case marked a turning point for the movement. When a
Puerto Rican social activist arrested for trespassing on federal property died
under suspicious circumstances in a federal prison, a veil of violence and
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terror descended upon Vieques’s struggle.4 The following month, clandestine factions of the Puerto Rican independence movement issued a response.
On December 4, 1979, gunmen ambushed a busload of navy personnel in
Sabana Seca, killing two sailors and wounding ten others. Several radical
groups claimed responsibility for the attack, calling it retaliation for the death
of Rodríguez and two young independentistas murdered at Cerro Maravilla.
The incident sent shock waves across Puerto Rico and the United States and
caused horror in Vieques.5 Under the shadow of this violence, and with deep
divisions within the Vieques movement, Governor Carlos Romero Barceló
intervened, signing a good-neighbor agreement with the navy (the Fortín
accord of 1983) that effectively diffused protest.

FORMATION OF A NEW MOVEMENT
For five decades Vieques languished as a cold-war hostage. The island
suffered direct material harm as a consequence of U.S. military expansion
and rivalry with the Soviets. To protest these conditions, however, was
deemed anti-American and subversive. The collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 changed the contours of debate. The end of the cold war changed the
political climate in Puerto Rico, diminishing the intensity of the anticommunist sentiment that had long constrained political expression. Geopolitical
shifts triggered a reevaluation and restructuring of the U.S. military. In this
context, local activists launched new grassroots efforts to build consensus for
a withdrawal of the military from Vieques. The military’s resistance to moderate efforts at political change was the catalyst for protest.
Because the United States was reassessing its military installations after
the cold war, activists initially sought to have Vieques included on the federal
list of military facilities to be closed. By drawing in a mix of citizens of different ages, classes, partisan political affiliation, and history of participation,
they aimed to form a new group that would lobby for change. After collecting
hundreds of signatures and traveling to Washington to advance their cause,
activists were dismayed when Carlos Romero Barceló, now Puerto Rican
resident commissioner in Washington, intervened with compromise legislation. Romero proposed leaving the eastern bombing range under military
control but recovering 8,000 acres of land in the west that was being used for
ammunition storage and was of questionable value for national defense.
While activists were skeptical of Romero’s motives, his intervention suggested a shifting political context. The advocacy of a member of the Partido
Nuevo Progresista (New Progress party—PNP, prostatehood), which was
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widely regarded in Puerto Rico as the most pro–United States party,
conferred legitimacy on the new movement.
The navy moved to thwart Romero’s proposal. In the midst of efforts to
reclaim land, it announced plans to erect a “relocatable-over-the-horizonradar” (ROTHR) station on some of the western land under consideration for
civilian use. Developed by the Raytheon Company during the cold war to
monitor Soviet fleets in the Pacific Northwest, this sophisticated radar system now had a new purpose: to scan the Caribbean and Latin America for aircraft carrying drugs to and from the United States. Governor Pedro Rosselló
hailed it as an important contribution to the war against drug trafficking, and
it gave the navy a new reason to hold onto 8,000 acres of land.
In Vieques, the perceived health threat of the radar became a rallying point
for new opposition to the navy. Residents were increasingly concerned about
contamination from military explosives and reports of high levels of certain
kinds of cancer in the community. The secretive nature of military activity
and the community’s lack of access to information intensified fear and suspicion. The navy’s determination to build the cluster of 34 towers, ranging in
height from 71 to 125 feet, despite local health concerns and the uncertainty
of scientific evidence, inflamed passions. The movement against the radar
system expanded to Puerto Rico, where a sister station was to be erected in
Lajas.
The opposition developed into a coalition movement with fronts in
Vieques and Lajas. While in Vieques the focus was mainly on the health and
environmental consequences of the radar facility, in Lajas protesters resisted
the seizure of agricultural land in the Puerto Rican heartland. The emphasis
on defending the land was reminiscent of struggles against strip mining and
the privatization of Puerto Rican beaches in the 1960s (Nieves Falcón, García
Rodríguez, and Ojeda Reyes, 1971). By 1995 there was mass support for the
struggle. In October tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on the
streets of San Juan in one of the largest mobilizations in Puerto Rico in years.
Delegations from Lajas and Vieques had effectively mobilized both cultural
nationalist sentiment about the land and fear of electromagnetic radiation.
Confrontation over military expansion and encroachment had been
channeled into discussion about the environment and health.
The coalition that Vieques and Lajas activists forged was a fundamental
aspect of the broad-based antinavy movement that emerged in Vieques in
1999. The radar mobilization renewed the solidarity network between activists in Vieques and in Puerto Rico. In contrast to the 1970s movement, in
which Viequenses were wary of losing control of the movement to outsiders,
the radar struggle was waged as a common struggle against military imposition.
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Significantly, the Catholic Church lent its support to the Viequenses’struggle
for health.
The antiradar mobilization pointed to a shifting political climate in Puerto
Rico as a whole. Three years later, the island was gripped by a massive general strike in response to the Rosselló administration’s plan to sell the stateowned telephone company to the U.S.-based GTE Corporation. The battle
over the telephone company evolved into a broader struggle against privatization and U.S. imposition. For 48 hours in early July 1998, more than half a
million workers and students shut down most government offices, universities, the ports, public buses, taxis, and numerous private businesses (Gonzalez, 1998). With a broad coalition of labor, student, environmental, community, cultural, political, and religious groups standing behind the telephone
workers’ unions, the strike was christened “the People’s Strike.” All over the
island, thousands of Puerto Rican flags symbolized support for the telephone
company and the nation. The struggle signaled a new militancy and consensus on the island and became an important precedent for the struggle that
unfolded in Vieques.

MOBILIZING FOR PEACE
David Sanes’s death opened a new chapter in a decades-long story of conflict between the U.S. Navy and the residents of Vieques Island. From a
short-term perspective, the movement was built on six years of grassroots
organizing and coalition building. Viewed more broadly, however, it was an
expression of a shift in the Puerto Rican political landscape. Hundreds of
thousands of Puerto Ricans throughout Puerto Rico and the diaspora put
aside political and religious differences to rally behind the cause of Vieques.
Puerto Rican celebrities such as Ricky Martin spoke out on behalf of the
island’s cause. In New York, the Puerto Rican Day parade, long a symbol of
ethnic pride that shied away from politics, embraced the cause of Vieques.
U.S.-based politicians traveled to Vieques, viewing their support of the struggle there as important to their electoral ambitions back home. Vieques not
only captured the daily headlines of Puerto Rican newspapers but entered the
mainstream debate in the United States, with President Bill Clinton publicly
expressing regret over David Sanes’s death.
The Vieques movement evolved from a local struggle over military
encroachment into a mass mobilization with international support. A key factor in the movement’s expansion was the strategic decision to frame grievances in more universal terms, as a struggle for peace. The framework of
peace appealed to a wide constituency. While in North America and Europe
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pacifism has been viewed as morally suspect, in Puerto Rico peace offered a
broad discourse that sidestepped partisan debate over colonialism. The discourse initially emanated from the Catholic Church and drew on both traditional religious ideology and more progressive notions of social justice. The
struggle for peace, however, also linked Vieques’s cause to the international
peace movement, nonviolent resistance, and opposition to militarism. The
broad discourse drew in a multiclass constituency of veteran activists,
women, youth, the elderly, and the formerly unaffiliated in Vieques. In
Puerto Rico and the United States, it attracted university students, the labor
movement, the religious sector, the political left, and the average citizen.
Peace functioned as a broad ideology that was interpreted in different
ways by the coalition movement. From the earliest days of the mobilization,
mainstream religious institutions supported Vieques’s cause as a struggle
against militarism, war, and violence. The Catholic Bishop of Caguas,
Alvaro Corrado del Río, traveled to Vieques to officiate at Sanes’s funeral
mass, signaling concern for the case at the very highest level of the Catholic
Church in Puerto Rico. Corrado called for the immediate exit of the navy, the
liberation of Puerto Rico from military domination, and the practice of civil
disobedience to stop the bombing (El Nuevo Día, May 23, 1999). He was
backed by the archbishop of San Juan, Roberto González Nieves, who traveled to New York calling for peace and justice for Vieques. Corrado launched
a campaign of “white flags for peace,” and Vieques was soon awash in white
flags hung from doorposts, clotheslines, windowboxes, and car antennas all
over the island.
The newly formed Vieques Women’s Alliance also decided to adopt the
symbolism of peace in its organizing efforts. Despite initial organizational
meetings in which Vieques women expressed concern about cancer and
health, activists elected to emphasize women’s concerns for peace in their
rhetoric and imagery. It was hard to prove that the navy caused cancer on the
island, one activist explained, whereas peace was a universally recognized
basic human right. The Women’s Alliance attached white ribbons to the
chain-link fence of Camp García as a testament to Viequenses’ desire for
peace and encouraged supporters to wear white ribbons as a symbol of that
desire. “Everyone loves the ribbons,” noted a leading activist. “We in Puerto
Rico operate on symbols. On the surface, the white ribbon seems so innocent,
feminine, and nice. It’s appealing. Everyone says, ‘Give me a ribbon. I’ll
wear that.’ But the more people see the ribbons, the more they think of
Vieques. It raises consciousness.”
Activists from the political left used peace as a discourse to internationalize their claims—to link Vieques’s struggle to global problems of inequality,
war, and militarism. They traveled to peace conferences in India, Hawaii,
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Okinawa, and Korea. Nobel Peace Prizewinners—the Dalai Lama and
Rigoberta Menchú—spoke out on behalf of peace for Vieques, while Oscar
Arias traveled to Vieques from Costa Rica. In New York, where organized
support for the Vieques cause emanated from the political left, activists combined the call for peace with more militant rhetoric. The Puerto Rican Day
parade of 2000 was devoted both to the struggle for peace in Vieques and to
the memory of the nationalist hero Pedro Albizu Campos.
Peace informed not only discourse but tactics. The movement was
strongly committed to nonviolence, a reflection of the moral support and
ideological influence of religious actors in defining and directing the struggle. Protestant and Catholic leaders emphasized peace and nonviolence not
only through sermons and prayers but through training programs in civil disobedience. All of the participants in the Catholic encampment on the bombing range, for example, received training in nonviolence and catechism.
Activists took their protest directly to the bombing range to block naval exercises. They chained the gates of the base shut and blocked access with church
pews on which elderly protesters sat vigil and said the rosary. They marched,
picketed, and clanged pots and pans in the street. Their militancy was tempered, however, by the commitment to nonviolence that gave discipline and
focus to the movement.
The solid backing of the religious sector gave Vieques’s struggle a new
legitimacy and moral authority.6 Church involvement helped change the
cold-war framework that depicted protest as anti-American or communistinspired. With priests and ministers throughout Vieques and Puerto Rico celebrating its work for peace, the movement expanded. Conservative denominations such as the Baptist church in Vieques spoke out against the “sinful”
naval bombing exercises. Individuals who had never felt comfortable participating in demonstrations joined prayer vigils for peace. What was particularly interesting was Catholics’ ability to form a coalition with mainline
Protestant and Pentecostal churches. Tensions between Catholicism and
Protestantism in Puerto Rico extended back to the U.S. occupation of 1898,
when the United States encouraged Protestant missionaries to convert, “civilize,” and “Americanize” the largely Roman Catholic island. The arrival in
1916 of Pentecostalism with its fundamentalism and socially conservative
morality further polarized the religious denominations on the island
(McGrath, 2000). The struggle to halt the bombing in Vieques brought
together Catholics, Baptists, Disciples of Christ, Episcopalians, Lutherans,
Methodists, Presbyterians, United Evangelicals, and even Pentecostals.
The unity of the religious sector was important on two levels. First, it
formed a very dramatic model of consensus building on an island deeply
divided along religious and political lines. Second, the coalition formed by
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the different religious denominations emerged as a powerful alternative to
the government when the Rosselló administration retreated from Vieques’s
cause. In the days after Sanes’s death, Governor Rosselló had called for a halt
to bombing in Vieques. His willingness to oppose the navy was a dramatic
departure from a position of seemingly unconditional support for all things
American and military.7 He championed Vieques for a period of nine months,
convening commissions on the impact of live bombing exercises on the
island that called for an immediate end to the bombing, cleanup of the contaminated land, the withdrawal of the navy, and the return of the land to the
islanders. Ultimately, however, he gave in to a plan pressed on Puerto Rico by
the Clinton administration that would allow for continued bombing of the
island, and his doing so threatened to fragment the unprecedented consensus.
The ecumenical coalition played a crucial role in maintaining the movement’s momentum. Leaders rejected the compromise, upset that the pact did
not include an option to halt all bombing immediately and that the navy
would be allowed to resume bombing exercises at least temporarily. They
denounced cash incentives to continue the bombing as immoral. Bishop
Corrado del Río declared that “there is no bomb sufficiently small to be morally acceptable.” In the face of angry denunciations by the governor, religious
leaders convened the Marcha para la Paz de Vieques, and on February 21,
2000, 150,000 demonstrators carrying white flags and demanding peace for
Vieques massed in the streets of San Juan. The silent march of tens of thousands of white-clad demonstrators, arguably the largest mass demonstration
in Puerto Rican history, marked a public repudiation of the compromise
agreement. Organized with the help of the Coordinadora Todo Puerto Rico
con Vieques, a civic group connected to labor and activist networks, the demonstration asserted the public will when the weak colonial state faltered. The
massive march infused the Vieques movement with energy and foreshadowed the movement’s ultimate success.

CONCLUSION
In the 1990s, in the aftermath of the cold war, there was a wave of mass
demonstrations in Puerto Rico that marked a rise in activism, militancy, and
unprecedented political consensus building on the island. The struggle to halt
the installation of the radar system in Vieques and Lajas, the telephone strike,
and the Vieques movement demonstrated successful coalition building
across party, class, religious, and territorial lines in a new political climate. A
key aspect of the recent Vieques movement’s success was the broad framework of peace that activists employed to advance their cause. Compared with
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the more circumscribed ideology developed in the 1970s, the discourse of
peace allowed local activists to build a broad coalition and cultivate consensus and international solidarity. The movement’s victory can be viewed as the
product not only of different strategies but of new political possibilities in the
post-cold-war world.
Vieques can be understood in relation to the recent wave of mobilizations
that pursue radical social change without seeking state power. Like the
Zapatista uprising and the Seattle demonstrations against the World Trade
Organization, the Vieques movement can be seen as part of a more widespread effort to block intrusions of state power and capitalism (see Falk,
1993; Holloway, 2002). By focusing on a concrete, achievable objective—
the halt to live bombing exercises—the Vieques movement was able to
achieve measurable success. As in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, activists connected a vision of world peace to a specific, winnable
battle.
After more than 100 years of domination by the U.S. military, in Vieques
Puerto Ricans for the first time exercised veto power (Rodríguez Beruff,
2001). By mobilizing to stop the naval bombing exercises, they challenged
the structures of power that had long controlled their island. Victor
Rodríguez Domínguez (2000) notes that in the history of U.S.–Puerto Rico
relations all of the major milestones have been set by the United States. The
Vieques mobilization marks a “refusal to accept” (Holloway, 2002) injustices of state power.

NOTES
1. Data in this section are drawn from McCaffrey (2002) and are the product of ethnographic,
documentary, and archival research.
2. For further discussion of the Culebra movement, see McCaffrey (2002) and Delgado
Cintrón (1989).
3. Vice Admiral G. E. R. Kinnear II testified that Vieques was crucial to maintaining the U.S.
edge in the balance of power with the Soviet Union: “The essential element that provides the U.S.
Navy its advantage over the Soviets is our ability to deploy high performance aircraft, that is, carrier aviation. They have us outnumbered in submarines and surface ships. Only in the area of high
performance aircraft at sea do we have the edge. The Roosevelt Roads training complex, of
which Vieques is an integral part, is absolutely essential in enabling us to maintain that margin”
(quoted in Langley, 1985: 274).
4. Angel Rodríguez Cristóbal was found dead in his prison cell two months into a six-month
jail term on trespassing charges. Prison officials declared his death a suicide, but an independent
autopsy concluded that he had been beaten to death.
5. The incident and the subsequent government cover-up shook the foundations of the Puerto
Rican political system. For further discussion, see Aponte Pérez (1995) and Suárez (1987).
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6. The Catholic Church’s advocacy for social justice and an end to the bombing in Vieques
marked a new development in Puerto Rico. Historically, the Church has acted as a conservative
force in Puerto Rican society. In the 1960s, when liberation theology swept across Latin America, it remained focused on doctrine, protesting not social injustice but birth control. Protestant
churches as well shied away from political involvement. During Vieques’s movement in the
1970s, the Catholic Church and the religious sector in general were absent from the struggle with
two exceptions; Bishop Antulio Parrilla was a strong supporter of efforts to remove the navy and
participated in civil disobedience on the island, and the U.S.-based American Friends Service
Committee also supported the movement.
7. During Rosselló’s administration, the National Guard took over public housing complexes
as part of a very visible, militarized campaign against drug trafficking. Rosselló supported the
ROTHR program and opposed Romero’s efforts to return empty land in western Vieques to civilian control.
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